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**THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S DEAL
WITH IRAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR
MISSILE DEFENSE AND
NONPROLIFERATION**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 10, 2015.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. I call this Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to order. And this afternoon we are here to discuss "The Obama Administration's Deal with Iran: Implications for Missile Defense and Nonproliferation."

We have testifying today a distinguished panel of witnesses. They are the Honorable Frank Klotz, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the Honorable Robert Scher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, the U.S. Department of Defense [DOD]; Christopher Almont, Senior Defense Intelligence Expert, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, Middle East Africa Regional Center, Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]; Vice Admiral James Syring, Director of Missile Defense Agency [MDA]; and Major General Steven Shepro, Vice Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, J5, Joint Staff.

I want to note that the subcommittee invited a witness from the State Department to testify today. We were told in writing that he was available. He would be watching us even now from his office since his schedule was open. However, he is not here today. I understand that senior officials at the State Department decided not to send him because the Department isn't ready to discuss implementation.

Well, I think every member of this subcommittee should be angered by the disrespect which this membership and our witnesses have been treated by the State Department. Moreover, the entire Congress, as it prepares to vote on the Iran agreement, should be bothered that we are being asked to vote on this agreement and Department of State won't discuss how it will be implemented.

With that unpleasaness aside, I will move to the joint hearing.

In February of 2014, Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, a lead negotiator of the Iran agreement whose record reflects she also gave us the Agreed Framework with North Korea that gave

the Kim family its nuclear weapons arsenal, stated in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that, quote, “It is true that in these first 6 months we have not shut down all of their production of any ballistic missile that could have anything to do with delivery of a nuclear weapon, but that is indeed something that has to be addressed as a part of a comprehensive agreement,” closed quote.

Now, let me repeat that, quote, “But that is indeed something that has to be addressed as a part of a comprehensive agreement,” closed quote.

We all know what has happened to Iran, Russia, and China instead. In July, the President’s senior military advisor, General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified, quote, “Under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking,” closed quote.

I want to repeat that. “Under no circumstances” is what he said. Why is this important? As stated by your senior DOD leadership, the ban on technology for ballistic missiles was critical to America’s own security, especially since Iran’s ballistic missiles would be dangerous weapons if they were ever equipped with chemical, biological, or even nuclear warheads.

Even if we assume the Iranians will honor the nuclear agreement, which we would be foolish to assume, we are paying no attention here to the chemical and biological weapons programs. Just this weekend, according to press reports, 45 Emirati soldiers fighting Iranian proxies in Yemen were killed by a ballistic missile with a conventional warhead. We don’t have missile defense solely because the bad guys may have nuclear capability.

I will read an excerpt from the most recent arms control compliance report on Iran:

“Based on available information, the United States cannot certify whether Iran has met its chemical weapons production facility declaration obligations, destroyed its specialized chemical weapons equipment, transferred CW”—chemical weapons—“or retained an undeclared chemical weapons stockpile. The JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] ignores this violation and provides Iran more funding for chemical and biological weapons. Iran is also not in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, the ballistic missiles it needs to deliver them.”

I also want to indicate my strong agreement with the letter sent by Chairman Thornberry and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Devin Nunes last week, which I will add to the record, that this agreement appears to have already started the cascade of proliferation in the Middle East.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. ROGERS. Unfortunately, I can’t say much more in this environment, but I believe Secretary Kerry owes this body information before we vote. Chairman Thornberry and Chairman Nunes asked for a response by this past Tuesday, and that response has not been provided.

I have stated before that I believe the administration concealed material information concerning Russia’s violation of the INF [In-

termediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty from the United States Congress while the Senate was considering the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty in 2010. I have come to the same conclusion about this.

I will cast my vote against the JCPOA, but I do not believe that the President will heed any call from this Congress about this legacy deal for him. We have a constitutional law professor as a President who seems to be unfamiliar with the Constitution's checks and balances, so we must all turn to cleaning up the mess that is being created and what is going to be required to fix it. I only hope that generations to come will not pay too high a price for the mistake of this President and what he is doing now.

Before turning to the ranking member for any opening statements that he may make, I want to remind all my colleagues who attended this morning's classified session on Iran's malign activities that that was a highly classified briefing, and details from this morning should not be discussed in this open session. We will adjourn to a closed briefing at the conclusion of this open hearing, and at that appropriate venue we can have discussion of those details.

And, with that, I turn to my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for any opening statement that he may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 25.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, welcome the witnesses, and I appreciate this opportunity to hear from them.

Let me emphasize the word "hear." This is called a hearing. It is not a press conference. We call it a hearing so that we can hear from the witnesses, which I look forward to doing.

And I would just urge the chairman and other colleagues who may come that we make this open portion as brief as possible so that we can get to the classified session, because I think that will be also much more useful as well as less risky in terms of what people around the world may hear.

This is the third briefing on Iran today, and it is the only one to have an open portion. So, with that, I would particularly urge my chairman and my colleagues to keep this open session as short as possible so that we can get to the classified session.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. I concur with that view.

General Klotz, we will start with you, if you could summarize your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF LT GEN FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

General KLOTZ. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA, reached between the P5+1

[China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany], the European Union, and Iran.

Let me state right up front, the Department of Energy [DOE] and the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA] value your robust support and abiding support for our mission and for our people. In that regard, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss a critical component of our overall mission, specifically our support to the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA. The IAEA, as you know, has a special responsibility in monitoring and verifying the nuclear-related measures detailed in the JCPOA.

I have provided a written statement, and I respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.

As Secretary of Energy Moniz has said, the JCPOA prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and it provides strong verification measures that would give us ample time to respond if Iran chooses to violate its terms. It is a very good deal for America, for our allies, and for our global security. And I fully share his view and this view.

The Department of Energy and NNSA's nuclear experts, national laboratories, and nuclear security sites were extensively involved throughout the negotiations, evaluating and developing technical proposals in support of the U.S. delegation. As a result of their work, Secretary Moniz has said that he is confident that the technical underpinnings of the JCPOA are solid and that the Department stands ready to assist the IAEA in its implementation.

Let me take a moment to discuss, as you requested, the Department's important work with the IAEA on nuclear safeguards.

Safeguards are defined as the set of technical measures applied by the IAEA to independently and objectively verify that a state's nuclear material is accounted for and not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. Safeguards also provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

These technical measures include, for example, on-site inspection; nuclear material accountancy; physical measurements; facility design information verification; containment using tamper-indicating tags and seals; surveillance, including the use of cameras; and environmental sampling.

DOE and NNSA have closely cooperated with the IAEA's Department of Safeguards for many decades in developing and enhancing these measures. The full range of our involvement with the IAEA is actually described in this recently just hot-off-the-press brochure prepared by the NNSA, and we have ample copies here for members and for staff if you choose to take one.

Our work with the IAEA also includes funding, training, technology transfers, and expertise. In fact, since 1980, every new IAEA inspector has had nuclear materials measurement training at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. And, every year, the Department hosts additional specialized training courses for IAEA inspectors and analysts both here and abroad.

Our partnership with the IAEA has also generated various technologies for use in safeguard systems. For example, the Online Enrichment Monitor, the OLEM, is one example of the technology jointly developed by our national laboratories and the IAEA. The

OLEM can continuously monitor the enrichment levels of uranium in gaseous forms at a centrifuge enrichment plant. And, for the first time, as a result of this JCPOA, the OLEM will be used in Iran.

Sir, I would be very happy to provide any additional information on our involvement in response to any questions you may have, either in this open session or in the closed session.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in the Appendix on page 28.]

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General.

Mr. Scher.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. SCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary SCHER. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on missile defense and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA. I am grateful for this committee's consistent attention to and continuing support of the critical mission of defending our homeland, our deployed forces, allies, and partners.

I, too, have submitted written testimony for the record so will look to keep these opening remarks relatively brief.

I would like to start by repeating what Secretary Carter has noted. The JCPOA places no limitations on the Department of Defense; no restrictions on our plans, programs, capabilities, or what we can do with our friends and allies.

For decades, we have focused on and prioritized the totality of challenges that Iran poses to our interests. The Department has organized itself to deal with Iran's ballistic missile capabilities through our preparations, partnerships, force posture, and plans.

I am happy to speak today about our missile defense policies, but, as you had noted, nonproliferation programs and sanction regimes fall outside of my portfolio, so I will have to defer those questions.

As you have been briefed, the JCPOA is a nuclear deal, not a ballistic missile deal. As such, it does not obviate the need for ballistic missile defenses, and it does not change our programs or plans for continued cooperation on missile defense.

Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and today can strike targets throughout the region and into Eastern Europe. While Iran has not yet developed an intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM], its progress on space-launch vehicles provides Iran the means to develop longer-range missiles.

There is no doubt in my mind that Iran's ballistic missile activities continue to pose a risk to the United States and our allies and partners in Europe, Israel, and the Gulf. However, this is exactly why the United States has maintained a robust missile defense posture throughout the region and why we have focused on missile defense cooperation with these same partners and allies.

I also want to reaffirm that the U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential limited ICBM attacks from Iran should they deploy such a capability in the future. We continue to

strengthen our homeland defense posture and invest in technologies which better enable us to address emerging threats in the next decade, including continued improvement to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense [GMD] system and the redesigned kill vehicle for the Ground-Based Interceptor [GBI].

Secondly, the administration continues to recognize the regional Iranian ballistic missile threat and remains committed to strengthening regional missile defenses. As President Obama stated in Prague on April 5, 2009, and I quote, “Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just in the United States but to Iran’s neighbors and our allies. As long as the ballistic missile threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven.”

In 2009, we went on to state that the European Phased Adaptive Approach would have the ability to defend all of NATO Europe from Iranian ballistic missiles, and that commitment remains.

Outside of NATO, we are working closely both operationally and on counter-ballistic missile development with Israel to address the Iranian ballistic missile threat. We are currently codeveloping missile defense technology with Israel on Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and the Arrow systems. Since 2001, we have provided over \$3 billion for missile defense to Israel.

As the Secretary also recently noted with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Ya’alon, we are full speed ahead on addressing these issues in collaboration with our Israeli counterparts.

The Department also continues to implement the deployment of missile defenses that are tailored to the security circumstances in the Middle East with a number of Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states, which I detail in my written statement. During the Secretary’s recent discussions with the Saudi Minister of Defense, we reiterated our commitment to working with Gulf countries on missile defense, specifically emphasizing the importance of collective BMD [ballistic missile defense] among the GCC countries, the importance of interoperability, and a common intelligence picture.

Members of the subcommittee, to conclude, I want to reiterate that, regardless of any deal, the Department will continue to improve our homeland defense capabilities against any potential Iranian ballistic missile threat; maintain a robust BMD posture throughout threatened regions, including the Middle East and Europe; and will focus on increasing cooperation with those same partners and allies to deter against and respond to any potential Iranian aggression.

I look forward to answering your questions in this session or, when necessary, in the following closed session. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Scher can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you.

Mr. Almont, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. ALMONT, SENIOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE EXPERT, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. ALMONT. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the

opportunity to offer testimony today regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, and implications for Iran's missile defense and nonproliferation.

Iran continues to be a threat to regional stability, as its regime's national interests often diverge with U.S. and our regional allies' security priorities in this dynamic and turbulent region. Understanding Tehran's support to terrorists and subnational armed groups as well as its military capabilities and regional ambitions are a priority for DIA's analysts and collectors. For years to come, we expect Iran to be a difficult target.

For Iran, its national security strategy remains to ensure the regime's survival, expand its regional influence, and enhance Tehran's military deterrence and regional superiority.

Iran's ballistic missile capability will continue to threaten U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Iran's overall defense strategy relies on a substantial inventory of theater ballistic missiles capable of striking targets throughout the region. Iran will continue to develop more sophisticated missiles and is improving the range and accuracy of its current missile systems irrespective of JCPOA implementation.

Iran publicly stated that it intends to launch a space-launch vehicle as early as this year. This vehicle would be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if configured as an ICBM.

Post-JCPOA economic growth could provide Tehran more money for ballistic missile development, but engineering and infrastructure challenges will remain. U.N. [United Nations] restrictions on ballistic-missile-related sales and purchases will remain in place for 8 years following adoption day or until the IAEA reaches its broader conclusion, whichever is sooner.

After the U.N. restrictions end, international and domestic tools, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, or MTCR, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and U.S. export controls will still apply, and the U.S. will retain its ability to impose missile-related sanctions under nonnuclear sanctions authorities, including Executive Orders 12938 and 13382.

In addition, secondary sanctions will continue to attach to foreign financial institutions and other persons that engage in transactions with Iranian missile proliferators sanctioned by the Department of the Treasury.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to discuss these important topics. I look forward to the subcommittee's questions and a more detailed discussion in the closed session.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Almont can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Almont.

Admiral Syring, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF VADM JAMES D. SYRING, USN, DIRECTOR,
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY**

Admiral SYRING. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, thank you for the opportunity to be here today and specifically address missile-defense-related questions.

I will save time and save my comments for the Q&A [question and answer] period. Again, thank you for the invitation.

Mr. ROGERS. How do you like that, Mr. Cooper?

Mr. COOPER. That is good.

Mr. ROGERS. I thought you would like that.

General, no pressure.

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN STEVEN M. SHEPRO, USAF, VICE DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, J5, JOINT STAFF

General SHEPRO. Very quick. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of this subcommittee. I likewise appreciate the opportunity to address your questions regarding the military implications of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The Joint Staff will remain concerned with over all of Iran's destabilizing activities within the region, among which is its expanding ballistic missile inventory and technology that Assistant Secretary Scher just underlined.

To address these concerns, we will preserve the military options at our disposal. We will likewise preserve our posture and engagements with our longstanding partners in the region to assure our mutual security.

I look forward to your questions.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, thank you.

I will recognize myself first.

General Klotz, you heard my reference to the DOE and State Department letters that Thornberry and Nunes sent. Do you have anything that you can tell us on the status of our response, when are we going to get a response?

General KLOTZ. Mr. Chairman, I understand that they are being actively worked within both departments as we speak.

Mr. ROGERS. So, no. All right.

General, let me stay with you just a minute. Is it correct the so-called 123 Agreement between the U.S. and the Emirates would prohibit possession of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology by that country?

General KLOTZ. I believe that is correct.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, is it correct that we have been seeking an agreement with Saudi Arabia for the same so-called gold-standard-type agreement?

General KLOTZ. That, sir, I think is something, since it is an ongoing discussion, that we ought to discuss in the closed session, if I could defer to that.

Mr. ROGERS. I will do that.

Mr. Almont, I may get the same response from you, but are you aware of any information concerning intentions of the UAE [United Arab Emirates] or Saudi Arabia regarding their plans to develop uranium enrichment capabilities?

Mr. ALMONT. And I, too, would like to defer until the—

Mr. ROGERS. All right.

Admiral Syring, are you aware of any discussions post-JCPOA of changing the deployment of Phase 3 of the EPAA in Poland?

Admiral SYRING. No, sir, I am not aware of any changes.

Mr. ROGERS. Great.

Mr. Scher, as the senior DOD witness here today, are you able to pledge without hesitation that the administration will make no changes whatsoever to the employment of the Aegis Ashore site in Romania and Poland as consequences of JCPOA?

Secretary SCHER. Currently, our plan stands as it always has, which is to make those deployments as you have discussed.

Mr. ROGERS. Great.

Mr. Cooper, you are recognized.

Mr. COOPER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am so looking forward to the classified session, I thought I would do what I could to expedite our movement to 2337.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Lamborn, you are recognized.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

Well, I do think this is an important issue that has public ramifications, as well as secure ramifications that we can talk about in closed session. So I want to talk about some things here openly and in public that I am curious about and the American people might be curious about.

Mr. Scher, you talked about that with the Israelis and joint missile defense projects that things were, quote, "We are full speed ahead."

Now, one thing that seems like a disconnect to me is that, when it comes to coproduction of the Arrow 3 and David's Sling, Israel has requested that, but we have made no response that I am aware of, and the administration provided no budget—no money for it in its budget.

Can you address coproduction of the Arrow 3 and David's Sling?

Secretary SCHER. I will briefly, but then Admiral Syring has that budget under his control, so I will ask for details from him.

But, in fact, my understanding is we continue to work together with the Israelis to identify what we need to do in terms of production, coproduction, and how much money we work together with in terms of how much we transfer to the Israelis as part of the MDA budget and that that continues to go along, based on Secretary Carter's recent visit to Israel, as had been planned.

So I would ask Admiral Syring, if that is okay, sir, Congressman, to fill in the details on what that cooperation actually looks like.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, but I may come back to you on this.

Secretary SCHER. Sure.

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral.

Admiral SYRING. Sir, let me take that.

There is ongoing dialogue and negotiations specifically on the David's Sling coproduction agreement, which is very important for us and very important for Israel. It is weeks away in terms of draft, probably months away in terms of final. But we had great success with the Iron Dome coproduction agreement; I expect similar success with David's Sling.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you for that information.

What about Arrow 3 coproduction?

Admiral SYRING. That would follow David's Sling, sir. We are focused on David's Sling today, as that will be the next system fielded and operational.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. All right. Thank you for that. I appreciate it.

And back to you, Mr. Scher. The President requested approximately \$155 million for Israeli missile defense in the fiscal year 2016 budget request, but Israel's actual needs were approximately \$475 million.

This seems like a three-to-one underfunding to me, only funding one-third of what appears to be the actual need. Can you discuss that?

Secretary SCHER. I know that we work very closely with the Israelis to try to figure out what the best funding approach is for our support to their programs and the ones that we do coproduction for.

The President forwarded to the Congress the figure that you talked about. We have had, I think, over \$3 billion of cooperation up to this point. We have, approximately, I think, overall, about half a billion dollars in the next fiscal year development plan for cooperation with Israel. And I would say that that is a negotiation to go on between Congress and the White House as to what the final number looks like.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay.

And changing subjects slightly, we have heard from the administration about missile defense integration and interoperability. We have been told that much of this will work through organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC.

However, there seem to be problems that are coming up. In an article called "Little Progress Made on Integrated GCC Missile Shield," we see that we haven't even been able to achieve agreement on the establishment of a command and control center or how it will be operated or even shared training capabilities and foreign disclosure.

Why is this not coming along better?

Secretary SCHER. I don't know the details of the negotiations on those, but what I do know is that, based on the Camp David summit, we have reenergized this approach to ensuring that the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are able to work more collaboratively together and with us. I think we have seen greater cooperation in the CAOC [combat air operations center] in terms of other operations, and my hope is certainly that we will continue that greater collaboration.

I know that folks from my team and many others have been out to the Gulf recently to work on the results of the Camp David summit, and we are continuing to follow through. The early warnings and indications piece is the first element of what we are trying to do and work very closely across the regional and also Missile Defense Agency to make sure that we can get over some of the problems that we may have seen in the past on this issue.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay.

And then in my remaining little bit of time, Admiral Syring, let me just ask you a general question about the budget.

If we have to resort to a continuing resolution for next year's defense, which the House has passed but the Senate appears unable to pass, what would that do to missile defense, in particular, that is under your portfolio?

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. Two items in particular: It would put pressure on the procurement accounts because that funding would

be limited. And, more specifically, it would not enable me to begin Poland MILCON [military construction] construction if the MILCON is tied up in the CR [continuing resolution]. And I view that as critically important, that we have those resources to release and the Army has the ability to get under contract as soon as possible, later in the first part of 2016.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. I thank you.

And Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you.

Just a question for Admiral Syring, if you could. Does the Iran deal change your assessment of the East Coast missile defense site?

Admiral SYRING. No, sir. So I can expand if you want me to.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Would you, please?

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir.

I have testified in front of this committee and others that there certainly is operational benefit to an East Coast field and capacity benefit to an East Coast field, but it is a matter of, where does that fit into the priorities, given limited resources on our homeland defense system?

Mr. GARAMENDI. And it would not be a priority?

Admiral SYRING. Sir, today, in the budget, it is a lower priority than in making the GMD program more reliable and more complete in terms of the kill chain.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. So you remain on the same path, that it is a low priority and we ought to be spending our money elsewhere. For example, on?

Admiral SYRING. Sir, we are focused on the improvements in the homeland defense program, not just in the GBI or the kill vehicle itself, but in the radars that we are adding, radar that we are adding in Alaska, and all the other improvements that you and I have talked about.

In this year's budget, in PB [President's budget] 2016, sir, we are proposing and requesting a shift in directed energy funding, in particular—

Mr. GARAMENDI. Shift towards?

Admiral SYRING. Towards more directed energy funding.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Oh, so directed towards directed energy.

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. And we ask for everybody's—all four committees' support with that, as we feel it imperative to get on with that development.

Mr. GARAMENDI. And with the East, if the legislation that we pass, NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] or appropriation, would force the money into the East Coast defense—or the East Coast missile defense site, that would be money that might otherwise be used for directed energy?

Admiral SYRING. Sir, it would come across multiple parts of the missile defense budget. It is not cheap. The cost estimate is \$3 billion to \$4 billion over a period of years, and, frankly, I don't have that in my budget control today.

Mr. GARAMENDI. So the other things would be the higher priorities that would be suffering on missile defense if we were to proceed with the East Coast site?

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. No further questions.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman.

The chairman recognizes Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a point of clarification that I was kind of surprised.

Mr. Almont, in your testimony, you spoke about the 8-year—the lifting of the ban on ballistic missile technology to Iran. And you said words to the effect that whatever is sooner, referencing the IAEA.

Did I hear you right, that the IAEA could make an assessment whereby that ban could be lifted early, or did I hear you wrong?

Mr. ALMONT. In fact, I mean, I think this is—I don't know this is necessarily an intelligence question. I think that the answer—I hate to say this, but I think that this is something that State could answer a little bit better, about how the IAEA could reach a broader conclusion.

But, essentially, I think that there is something in the agreement that allows them to make an agreement—draw a conclusion about whether or not Iran is in compliance with the terms of the JCPOA and that the clock changes in terms of the arms embargo.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. I was not aware of that. So what you are saying is—under what circumstances would the IAEA make that assessment, that, in fact, that they could be accelerated in terms of lifting the ban on ballistic missiles?

Mr. ALMONT. That, I don't think I am qualified to answer that question. I think that is something—

Mr. COFFMAN. Is there somebody here that could answer that question? Because this is a pretty critical point.

General KLOTZ. I would be happy to pursue that in closed session.

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, I would like to know, is there somebody that could answer that question that is here? This is a very critical point.

General KLOTZ. I can pursue it in closed session.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Well—

Mr. ROGERS. We are going to have a closed session right after this.

Mr. COFFMAN. I don't understand. Why would that be classified?

General KLOTZ. We can take a look at what specifically is written in the JCPOA in terms of when the various dates, various milestones take place.

Mr. Almont is right; there is a provision within the JCPOA for adoption day occurring at 8 years or when the IAEA has made the broader conclusion. When that takes place—that is known as transition day. When that takes place, the U.N. Security Council can lift its restrictions on ballistic missiles. And there is a whole series of other things which we can detail that would take place at transition day.

Mr. COFFMAN. Can you point to where that is in the agreement? Is this one of these side agreements, or is this in the—

General KLOTZ. No, this is in the agreement itself.

Mr. COFFMAN. This is in the agreement. Where is that in the agreement?

General KLOTZ. It is in Annex 5, which is called the Implementation Plan. And it describes in some detail specifically what will happen. On the copy that I have, it is the second page of Annex 5 in the actual JCPOA, sir.

Mr. COFFMAN. So is this anytime within—can you just tell me, is it anytime after this agreement is implemented that the IAEA then can make that assessment? Or is there a threshold in terms of a number of years after the implementation of the agreement that the IAEA is free to make that assessment?

General KLOTZ. Well, the threshold is a list of a dozen specific things that Iran has to satisfy in terms of the Arak heavy water research reactor, heavy water production plants, enrichment capability, and so on, which it has to, as I said, it has to implement. And the IAEA has to verify that it has, in fact, implemented each of those steps, which are laid out in great detail in Annex 3 of the JCPOA.

Realistically, that is going to take some time. But, no, in this specific thing, it is at 8 years or when that broader conclusion is reached by the IAEA that Iran has met its nuclear-related measures as specified in the JCPOA.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. I think the American people need to be—well, Congress certainly needs to know, but the American people need to be aware of that. I think that is very surprising.

Mr. Almont, can you tell me about Iran's biological and chemical weapons capabilities and their ability to weaponize biological and chemical weapons?

Mr. ALMONT. If we can wait till the closed session, I can address that, sir.

Mr. COFFMAN. That is amazing. Okay.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I think everything is pretty much in closed session. And I really question the security classifications that are being used, that might, in fact, be politically embarrassing, and anything politically embarrassing seems to be classified.

I yield back.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, as Mr. Almont stated, we could have gotten some answers to some of your questions if the State Department hadn't refused to send a witness to this hearing.

Mr. Bridenstine is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am deeply troubled by the Obama administration's last-minute concessions to Iran on lifting the conventional weapons and missile embargoes.

In testimony to this subcommittee, the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that, quote, "Iran's goal is to develop capabilities that will allow it to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons," unquote. Lifting these bans makes no sense. Iran's words and actions clearly show its desire, in spite of the deal, to build longer-range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles and proliferate them throughout the region.

In February, Iran conducted its fourth successful satellite launch, this one aboard a two-stage Safir booster. The Safir is based on the Shahab-3, Iran's most advanced ballistic missile. Iran's supposedly peaceful space program is simply a cover for long-range ballistic missile development.

Last week, the head of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps publicly announced plans to expand the range of Iran's ballistic missiles. Iran's President, Hassan Rouhani, declared last week that Iran is, quote, "not committed to the restrictions on its missile program," unquote.

Israel is Iran's number-one target. While the administration says it is doing everything possible to help protect Israel, the budgetary record tells a different story.

And, Mr. Scher, you talked about this when you did your opening statement.

I have two charts. Could I get those up on the screen for everybody to see? And then we have handouts, as well.

[The charts referred to can be found in the Appendix on pages 51 and 52.]

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Can we get those up on the screen? I was told that we could get those up.

Is that a no, Joy?

Mr. ROGERS. Apparently.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay.

Well, the charts in front of you illustrate the administration's requested funding for Israeli missile defense versus actual congressional appropriations. Congress consistently appropriates funding much closer to Israeli requirements.

The first chart covers funding for all Israeli missile defense programs. The President requested approximately \$158 million for Israeli missile defense in the fiscal year 2016 budget request. The House and Senate Defense Appropriations bills both would appropriate Israeli missile defense at over \$338 million. So it is a comparison of \$158 million to \$338 million, a figure much closer to Israel's actual need.

Secretary Kerry and the President like to tout the administration's support for Israeli missile defense. Yet, year after year, the President's budget request ends up much, much lower than congressional appropriations, which are much closer to Israel's needs. Congress always appropriates much closer to what Israel asks us for based on its national security requirements.

Mr. Scher, can you explain this difference?

Secretary SCHER. Congressman, we appropriate with a combination of understanding of what we have worked with the Government of Israel and also understanding the other requirements for missile defense money that goes to protection of U.S. homeland and articulation of U.S. systems and U.S. programs.

And the President's recommendation then gets forwarded to Congress. And then we implement the funding that is eventually agreed to by Congress and signed out by the President.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So, when the President sends his budget request—it is now up on the screen. I think everybody can see it.

Year after year, the President's budget request is far below what Israel asks for. And, of course, Israel is very concerned because

now there is this agreement with Iran. And it is also far below what Congress would like.

Is that going to change?

Secretary SCHER. Right now, it obviously did not change for this year. I am not willing—I don't know the answer to follow-on years.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay.

Let's go to the next chart, please.

I have particular interest in David's Sling, as the coauthor of the David's Sling Authorization Act. The President requested approximately \$225 million from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2016 for David's Sling. Over the same time, according to the Government of Israel, with which this committee agreed, the actual requirement was \$770 million. The administration underfunded the requirement by one-third.

Mr. Scher, can we expect this underfunding for David's Sling to continue under the Iran deal? Is this what the administration means by "support of Israel"?

Secretary SCHER. We will continue to look at how we can better cooperate on David's Sling. Admiral Syring mentioned this previously. I am happy to encourage if there are any—more details. But that is a newer program, and, hence, the figures and the viability of those specific figures changes as we look through.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman's time has expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Chairman Turner, for 5 minutes.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Klotz, I would like to talk to you, as our chairman has, about the 123 Agreements and nations who have agreements with the United States that may or may not be at risk.

I know that whenever we have an open session and a closed session there is always this sensitivity between the issue of what is open and what is closed. So I want to ask you a question about that line.

So if the UAE, the United Arab Emirates, picked up the phone and called Secretary Kerry and said, "We affirm our requirements and our agreements with the United States and our 123 Agreements and we will not pursue any uranium enrichment," we could discuss that openly, right? Because it is just affirming an ongoing commitment that is there that we all know is public.

General KLOTZ. Yes. The 123 Agreement with the United Arab Emirates is public.

Mr. TURNER. But the affirmation of it, the fact that the UAE has no intention of reevaluating it, that there is no discussion about pursuing uranium enrichment, that there is no concern about the agreement as a result of the agreement with Iran, if all that was affirming, you would be able to discuss that in this meeting, right? Because it is all the status quo.

General KLOTZ. You know, I don't really know the answer to that, Congressman, because I am having a little difficulty following the question. It would—

Mr. TURNER. Well, let me help you.

General KLOTZ. I suspect it would depend on how that was communicated to the United States. If it was made public by a member

state, what its intentions were, that would be something which I assume we could discuss. If it was something that was passed on in confidential—

Mr. TURNER. Well, let me help you.

General KLOTZ. Yeah.

Mr. TURNER. There are also prohibitions against lying to Congress. Do you have any information that a nation, such as United Arab Emirates, has contacted the United States and indicated that they intend to walk away from their 123 Agreement obligations that restrict uranium enrichment?

General KLOTZ. I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. TURNER. No one has informed you from the administration or from any other agency that they have information of that?

General KLOTZ. Not me personally.

Mr. TURNER. So you have had no discussions with anyone that anyone has related to you of their awareness or information of a concern of 123 Agreement and the United Arab Emirates and their issues with respect to uranium enrichment?

General KLOTZ. To the best of my knowledge, no, that has not been a subject. I am aware of what the UAE 123 Agreement is in a general sense, but I have not been involved in any specific discussions on that subject.

Mr. TURNER. I am troubled by your word “specific.” Have you had unspecific discussions?

General KLOTZ. Congressman, I have not had any discussions or any special briefings on UAE 123 Agreement.

Mr. TURNER. Okay.

General KLOTZ. I am aware of it because it is one of the 123 Agreements that the United States has with other nations, and I have read a lot in the press and in other documents about that particular agreement but not about the specific issue that you raised.

Mr. TURNER. Well, you would certainly understand our concern, because, as Congress takes up the issue of the Iranian agreement, Secretary Kerry has made absolute statements to Congress that there is no one in the Middle East who will change their obligations with respect to nonproliferation or their relationship with the United States with respect to uranium enrichment.

And, certainly, if anyone had information that that was other than how the Secretary of State has represented it, it should be known by decision-makers. Because they are not just voting on the issue of Iran; they are voting on nuclear programs by Iran and their neighbors. You could see why that would be a level of concern.

General KLOTZ. I understand—I understand your point, Congressman.

Mr. TURNER. Excellent.

Well, we are going into closed session, and I know you have availed yourself of the issue of closed session. I am very concerned about the issue of the—as we look to the IAEA and the portions of the document that are secret, with the IAEA’s relationships and deals with Iran concerning inspections.

Do you have information that you are going to be able to provide us in the closed session concerning the secret agreement that we have not seen?

General KLOTZ. I am willing to discuss what we know about that particular issue in the closed session.

Mr. TURNER. Do you have details?

General KLOTZ. I have information which we can discuss in the closed session.

Mr. TURNER. Have you seen that agreement?

General KLOTZ. I have not seen that agreement.

Mr. TURNER. Yeah, that would be fairly consistent with what everyone else has done, but yet we have people who are willing to vote in favor of an agreement that includes secret provisions that no one has seen and you have not either.

I yield back.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the chairman.

We can't get into the SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility] for 10 more minutes, so I am going to let Mr. Lamborn ask one more question and I am going to ask one more.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me for asking one more question.

And I will start with Admiral Syring and General Shepro. And my purpose isn't to put you on the spot. My purpose is to get your best judgment, because this is such an important issue that we are voting on. It is historic.

Were you, either of you, consulted before the negotiators, whether it was the Secretary or the President, agreed to drop the ballistic missile embargo on Iran as part of the JCPOA? Were either of you consulted about that?

Admiral SYRING. No, sir.

General SHEPRO. No, sir.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. And I guess that is what I assumed. Had you been, what concerns would you two have shared to whoever asked you?

Admiral SYRING. Sir, I will take that first.

You know, my focus in missile defense against Iran is unchanged by the agreement. We remained entirely focused on their rapid escalation of capability and capacity over the last several years, and we made absolutely the right decision to focus on regional defense for that potential escalation.

And I can tell you that my job is to be pessimistic, not optimistic, and everything we do at the Agency is planning for that capability to increase and that capacity to increase at the rate it has. And, as far as I am concerned, we—and I have read the agreement—we remain focused on that very mission.

Mr. LAMBORN. General.

General SHEPRO. Sir, I represent the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], and, as he has said on the Hill before, this agreement addresses one point of friction with Iran.

Mr. LAMBORN. Excuse me?

General SHEPRO. This agreement addresses one point of friction with Iran, the nuclear arena, and that we must keep pressure on the other malign activities.

And so, as Chairman Rogers has cited in the beginning, I agree with the Chairman that we must continue to keep pressure on this area of development of ballistic missiles.

Mr. LAMBORN. And I will just make a comment. It was a nuclear agreement, but we all of a sudden see arms embargo lifted and ballistic missile embargo lifted, which are nonnuclear issues. I mean, there were enough concessions already, but then to add those on top of it really staggers me.

General, don't you have a concern about the ballistic missile embargo being lifted?

General SHEPRO. Again, I will cite Chairman Dempsey's previous statements that, in a perfect world, the embargo would remain, but, as it is, we remain concerned about this, and we must continue to keep pressure on this area.

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Aguilar.

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Klotz and the Vice Admiral, with respect to budget and allocations for missile defense, is it fair to say with sequestration technically kicking back in in October that that would also affect the support that we could offer for missile defense for our allies, in addition to a continuing resolution that could also offer reduced support and aid? Is that fair to say, as well?

General KLOTZ. Well, sir, I don't deal with missile defense in the National Nuclear Security Administration. But let me just say, since you have created an opportunity to do that, that there are a number of very, very important programs that are underway within the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration which apply to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal and posturing ourselves for the future that would be severely affected by sequestration or budget caps and without any relief from that.

Admiral SYRING. And, sir, for missile defense, and I will just talk to your specific concerns on the CR, that certainly procurement account pressure would happen under the CR. But my more specific concern earlier was the potential impact on the MILCON for Poland and EPAA Phase 3, which gets to your point on exactly what are we doing with our allies and would it affect that. So the answer would be yes.

And then, for sequestration, I have testified in front of this committee and others that sequestration at the levels that are being considered would be catastrophic to what we have proposed with the improvements that must be made for homeland defense and the regional defense systems.

In particular, the redesigned kill vehicle and the new radar would be at risk, and I have testified before that I view that as overmatching. If those improvements aren't made, our system could be overmatched by 2020.

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman.

The Chair is informed that Mr. Turner has one more question.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Klotz, just one more addition. I would recommend that you do pick up the phone and call the Secretary of State and ask him if there is any additional information that he should provide

to you that is inconsistent with your statements today and if there is any information he needs to update you on.

General KLOTZ. Well, I will see if he will take my call. I doubt if an Under Secretary from the Department of Energy would necessarily get through on the first try.

Mr. TURNER. The effort, since you put such an admirable effort forward here, it would probably be helpful.

General KLOTZ. Thank you for the suggestion, Congressman.

Mr. TURNER. General Shepro, representing, obviously, the Joint Staff, Admiral Syring has said an answer on the East Coast missile defense site, of which I am an advocate for, that I don't criticize in any respect. And I think the Admiral has articulated both a need and a desirability for an East Coast missile defense site but has recognized the fiscal constraints under which he is under and has, you know, identified that as a problem for executing an East Coast missile defense site.

But even though I am an advocate for the East Coast missile defense site, I am obviously not the initiator of the East Coast missile defense site. We always, here on the Armed Services Committee, look to the experts, those in the military, as to what their needs are when we, as the Admiral has so greatly articulated, try to allocate resources.

And, General, perhaps you could give us an articulation on the issue of our response to NORTHCOM [Northern Command]. NORTHCOM continues to include in its integrated priority list the need for an additional interceptor site, a third site in the United States defense of the homeland.

We didn't make this up. We are just agreeing that there is the need, which I think Admiral Syring has recognized the need and the benefits of a third site. And, in that, it is our attempt to try to respond to it in allocating resources.

We are the ones who obviously have to pick where those resources come from. We are not telling the admiral, we are going to do this and you have to go take it from your existing programs. It is something that we have to find the money for.

Could you articulate that—NORTHCOM has continued to identify it on the integrated priority list. That still sounds pretty important, isn't it?

General SHEPRO. Yes, sir. Important, yes. But if you want to listen to the expert, I have to defer to Admiral Syring, because he is.

Mr. TURNER. Admiral.

Admiral SYRING. Mr. Turner, thank you.

It has showed up in their priority list. And I would just cite, sir, that it is a priority list, in terms of—there are many other requirements in that list that we are addressing. And we can go through that in detail, in terms of funding allocated to both NORTHCOM and STRATCOM's [Strategic Command's] priority list—

Mr. TURNER. But what I was looking for—and I understand your prior answer, Admiral, of the allocation of resources and priorities. But I wanted your answer—or, actually, either of your answers—on the issue of need. I mean, since it is showing up on the integrated party list, it is a need. Could you describe the need?

Admiral SYRING. The need or the benefit is operational and capacity.

Mr. TURNER. And what would that be?

Admiral SYRING. It would allow more interceptors, which is always better in terms of the warfighter, and it would allow more decision space, as both combatant commanders have testified to.

Mr. TURNER. Explain "decision space."

Admiral SYRING. "Decision space" in terms of a potential threat from Iran, an ICBM in particular, and what that would provide in terms of interceptor fly-out time and future assessment capability.

And I will just leave it at that.

Mr. TURNER. Well, you know, I have a minute and a half left, and I would like to not leave it at that.

Okay, so additional time and interceptors. Obviously, proximity is one, right?

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir.

Mr. TURNER. The East Coast is closer than Alaska, where the other missiles might be coming from.

Admiral SYRING. Geographically.

Mr. TURNER. Correct.

And you said additional decision making. Well, that would also be an issue of what we have referred to and you have referred to as "shoot, look, shoot," right?

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir.

Mr. TURNER. You will be able to apply an asset to incoming asset, have an opportunity to assess whether or not the United States, hundreds of thousands of Americans at risk require an additional shot, correct?

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir.

Mr. TURNER. So that is what you are talking about, the ability to shoot twice, the ability to try to take something out of the sky, the ability to eliminate a threat to mainland United States.

Admiral SYRING. Sir, I would just qualify that by having a first-shot opportunity sooner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you for elaborating.

That is all.

Mr. ROGERS. I think that is it.

Before we do go into closed session, though, Mr. Almont, I did want to ask you something I think you can answer in the open session.

In your prepared statement, you cite Iranian claims that it would launch a space-launch vehicle as early as this year. And you also stated, this vehicle will be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if configured as an ICBM.

Didn't they just test that earlier this year?

Mr. ALMONT. They did tests on the 2nd of September, I believe, and they have announced that they are going to attempt another launch of that same system sometime in the near future.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

All right. We are going to adjourn and then reconvene in 2337 in about 5 minutes. We are in adjournment.

[Whereupon, at 3:02 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed session.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015

**Opening Statement of Hon. Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces**
HEARING ON
**The Obama Administration's Deal with Iran: Implications for Missile Defense and
Nonproliferation**
September 10, 2015

This afternoon, we are here to discuss, "The Obama Administration's Deal with Iran: Implications for Missile Defense and Nonproliferation."

We have testifying today a distinguished panel of witnesses. They are:

The Honorable Frank Klotz
Administrator
National Nuclear Security Administration

The Honorable Robert M. Scher
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities
U.S. Department of Defense

Mr. Christopher J. Almont
Senior Defense Intelligence Expert
Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, Middle East/Africa Regional Center (MARC)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Vice Admiral James Syring, USN
Director
Missile Defense Agency

Major General Steven M. Shepro, USAF
Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5
Joint Staff

I want to note that the subcommittee invited a witness from the State Department to testify here today. We were told, in writing, that he was available—he may be watching us even now from his office since his schedule was open. However, he is not here today. I understand that senior officials at the State Department decided not to send him because the Department "isn't ready to discuss implementation." Well, I think every member of

this subcommittee should be angered by the disrespect with which the Membership – and our witnesses—have been treated by the Department of State. Moreover, the entire Congress, as it prepares to vote on the Iran agreement, should be bothered that we are being asked to vote on this agreement, and the Department of State won’t discuss how it will be implemented.

With that unpleasantness, I will move on to the point of the hearing.

In February of 2014, Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, a lead negotiator of the Iran agreement—whose record reflects she also gave us the Agreed Framework with North Korea that gave the Kim family its nuclear weapons arsenal—stated in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that, “It is true that in these first six months we’ve not shut down all of their production of any ballistic missile that could have anything to do with delivery of a nuclear weapon. But that is indeed something that has to be addressed as part of a comprehensive agreement.”

Let me repeat that, “But that is indeed something that has to be addressed as part of a comprehensive agreement.” We all know what was conceded to Iran, Russia, and China instead.

In July, the President’s senior military advisor, General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that, “under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking.”

Let me repeat that, “under no circumstances.”

Why is this important? As stated by our senior DOD leadership, “the ban, on technology for ballistic missiles, was critical to America’s own security, especially since Iran’s ballistic missiles would be dangerous weapons if they were ever equipped with chemical, biological or even nuclear warheads.”

Even if we assume the Iranians will honor the nuclear agreement, which we would be foolish to assume, we are paying no attention here to their chemical and biological weapons programs.

Just this weekend, according to press reports, 45 Emirati soldiers fighting Iranian proxies in Yemen were killed by a ballistic missile with a conventional warhead.

We don’t have missile defense solely because the bad guys may have nuclear capability.

I will read an excerpt from the most recent arms control compliance report on Iran:

Based on available information, the United States cannot certify whether Iran has met its chemical weapons production facility (CWPF) declaration obligations, destroyed its specialized chemical weapons (CW) equipment, transferred CW, or retained an undeclared CW stockpile.

The JCPOA ignores this violation and provides Iran more funding for chemical and biological weapons—Iran is also not in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention—and the ballistic missiles it needs to deliver them.

I also want to indicate my strong agreement with the letter sent by Chairman Thornberry and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Devin Nunes last week, which I will add to the record, that this agreement appears to have already started the cascade of proliferation in the Middle East. Unfortunately, I can't say much more in this environment, but, I believe Secretary Kerry owes this body information before we vote. Chairman Thornberry and Chairman Nunes asked for a response by this past Tuesday; that response has not been provided.

I have stated before that I believe the Administration concealed material information concerning Russia's violation of the INF treaty from the United States Congress while the Senate was considering the New START treaty in 2010.

I have come to the same conclusion about the JCPOA.

I will cast my vote against the JCPOA, but I do not believe the President will heed any call from this Congress about this legacy deal for him. We have a constitutional law professor as President who seems to be unfamiliar with the Constitution's checks and balances.

So, we must all turn to cleaning up the mess that is being created and what will be required to fix it.

I only hope the generations to come will not pay too high a price for the mistake the President is making now.

Gen. Frank G. Klotz (Ret.)
Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Washington, DC
September 10, 2015

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached between the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union, and Iran. I appreciate the opportunity to be here to discuss U.S., and in particular the Department of Energy's (DOE) – specifically the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) – support of and involvement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

As Secretary Moniz has said, the JCPOA prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, provides strong verification measures that give us ample time to respond if Iran chooses to violate its terms, and takes none of our options off the table.

America's leading nuclear experts at the Department were involved throughout these negotiations. The list of laboratories and sites that provided support is extensive, including Argonne National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, Savannah River National Laboratory, the Y-12 National Security Complex, and the Kansas City National Security Campus.

These nuclear experts were essential to evaluating and developing technical proposals in support of the U.S. delegation. As a result of their work, the Secretary has said that he is confident that the technical underpinnings of the JCPOA are solid and the Department stands ready to assist in its implementation. I want to underscore that the United States – in particular the DOE/NNSA and our national laboratories – has for many decades closely cooperated with the IAEA Department of Safeguards to ensure that the IAEA has what it needs to implement international safeguards and verification around the world.

Let me take a moment to explain the U.S Government's support to and involvement with the IAEA, and then I will discuss the Department's work with the IAEA on nuclear safeguards. The United States provides approximately 25 percent of the IAEA's regular budget through our assessed contribution. The United States also provides voluntary extra-budgetary contributions, beyond the regular assessed contribution, in support of the IAEA's safeguards, security, and safety missions, as well as to support IAEA technical cooperation projects.

U.S. assistance also includes considerable in-kind assistance to the IAEA, including technical assistance from our national laboratories. U.S. in-kind contributions include the provision of technology and equipment, subject matter experts, IAEA inspector training, and support to IAEA-hosted training courses for Member State representatives in safety, security and safeguards. Together, these U.S. contributions help ensure that the IAEA has the tools, training,

and resources it needs to carry out its responsibilities to safeguard nuclear materials and facilities worldwide to detect and deter nuclear proliferation.

I would like to share with the Subcommittee a few examples of the substantial safeguards work that NNSA supports. Every year, the Department hosts training courses for IAEA inspectors and analysts on a wide range of topics including measuring nuclear materials, inspector access under the Additional Protocol, advanced plutonium verification, enrichment technology, export controls and commodity identification. These courses are organized and implemented with the support of experts from our national laboratories and take place in the United States, at IAEA facilities in Vienna, and at international nuclear facilities in collaboration with other IAEA Member States. For example, every new IAEA inspector since 1980 has had nuclear materials measurement training at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

The Department's national laboratories have played a major role in developing and improving safeguards technologies and providing expertise since the IAEA's inception in 1957. They develop and transfer various technologies to the IAEA for use in safeguards systems all over the world. This equipment goes through a rigorous evaluation process by the IAEA before being accepted into routine use, including vulnerability analyses by independent parties. The On-line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) is one example of a technology jointly developed by our national laboratories and the IAEA. The OLEM is an innovative safeguards technology that can be used to continuously monitor the enrichment levels of uranium in gaseous form at a centrifuge enrichment plant. And for the first time, as a result of the JCPOA, OLEM will be used in Iran.

In addition to our training and safeguards technology cooperation, five of the Department's national laboratories participate in the IAEA's Network of Analytical Laboratories, or NWAL, a network of 20 laboratories in 10 countries that provide analytical services to the IAEA. These laboratories undergo a rigorous qualification process by the IAEA to ensure that they maintain the highest quality standards. While the IAEA analyzes material and environmental samples at its laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria, the agency also relies upon its NWAL to assist in sample analysis for logistical purposes, quality control and to have access to state-of-the-art techniques. Environmental sampling, in particular, is a very powerful tool that the IAEA uses to determine if undeclared activities are occurring. The presence of nuclear material can be detected even at very minute levels, after long periods of time, and even after efforts have been made to sanitize the area. The IAEA relies on the U.S. laboratories that are part of the NWAL because of our world class capabilities for high-precision analysis and quality control.

Finally, the United States provides personnel to the IAEA to support the Department of Safeguards in a variety of areas, including technology development, information and statistical analysis, and development of safeguards approaches. As of June, approximately 10 percent of the workforce of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards was from the United States, and many of these Americans have worked for DOE or our National Laboratory system. We are proud of the assistance we provide and the close collaboration we have with the IAEA.

The JCPOA is not built on trust. It is built on hard-nosed requirements that will limit Iran's activities and ensure access, transparency, and verification. To preclude cheating, IAEA inspectors will be given unprecedented access to all of Iran's declared nuclear facilities and any

other sites of concern, as well as the entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium supply to centrifuge manufacturing and operation. And this access to the uranium supply chain comes with a 25 year commitment.

The IAEA will be explicitly permitted to use advanced technologies, such as enrichment monitoring devices and electronic seals, in Iran's facilities. As I mentioned, many of these advanced technologies have been developed at DOE/NNSA national laboratories. Use of these technologies will increase not only the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards but also the efficiency of inspection activities, resulting in best use of an important IAEA resource – trained and experienced inspectors.

If the international community suspects that Iran is trying to cheat, the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location. Much has been made about a 24 day process for ensuring that IAEA inspectors can gain access to undeclared nuclear sites. In fact, the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location with 24 hours' notice under the Additional Protocol, which Iran will implement under this deal. This deal does not change that baseline.

However, recognizing that disputes could arise regarding IAEA access to undeclared facilities, the JCPOA provides a crucial new tool for resolving such disputes within a short period of time so that the IAEA gains the access it needs in a timely fashion — within no more than 24 days. This new tool does not in any way limit the IAEA's access rights or inspection timelines under Iran's safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol. Most important, environmental sampling can detect microscopic traces of nuclear materials even after attempts are made to remove the nuclear material. As I mentioned, the IAEA's Network of Analytical Laboratories, including U.S. laboratories, often helps to analyze such samples.

In fact, Iran's history provides a good example. In February 2003, the IAEA requested access under Iran's safeguards agreement to a suspicious facility in Tehran suspected of undeclared nuclear activities. Negotiations over access to the site dragged on for six months, but even after that long delay, environmental samples taken by the IAEA revealed nuclear activity even though Iran had made a substantial effort to remove and cover up the evidence. The JCPOA dramatically shortens the period over which Iran could drag out such an access dispute.

The JCPOA contains provisions of different duration — with some provisions in place for 10 years, others for 15 years and others for 20 or 25 years. It is critical to note that even after 25 years, key constraints and transparency measures, such as Iran's enduring obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards agreement, and the new legal obligations Iran will assume under the Additional Protocol, remain in place indefinitely.

In closing, I want to acknowledge the tireless work of the negotiating team, led by Secretary Kerry. The U.S. multi-agency delegation worked together collegially and seamlessly, and the P5+1 displayed remarkable cooperation and cohesion throughout this complex endeavor.

The JCPOA is based on sound scientific and technical analysis. Because of its deep grounding in exhaustive technical analysis, carried out largely by highly capable DOE scientists and

engineers, and because of the solid foundation of the IAEA, I am confident that this is a good deal for America, for our allies, and for our global security.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I look forward to answering your questions.

Lieutenant General Frank G. Klotz, USAF (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Frank G. Klotz, United States Air Force (Ret), was confirmed by the Senate on Tuesday, April 8, 2014, as the Department of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

As Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Lt. Gen. Klotz is responsible for the management and operation of the NNSA, as well as policy matters across the Department of Energy and NNSA enterprise in support of President Obama's nuclear security agenda.

Prior to his Senate confirmation, Lt. Gen. Klotz served in a variety of military and national security positions. As the former Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, a position he held from 2009 to 2011, he established and then led a brand new 23,000-person organization that merged responsibility for all U.S. nuclear-capable bombers and land-based missiles under a single chain of command. From 2007 to 2009, Lt. Gen. Klotz was the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and Director of the Air Staff. He served as the Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command from 2005 to 2007 and was the Commander of the Twentieth Air Force from 2003 to 2005.

Lt. Gen. Klotz served at the White House from 2001 to 2003 as the Director for Nuclear Policy and Arms Control on the National Security Council, where he represented the White House in the talks that led to the 2002 Moscow Treaty to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. Earlier in his career, he served as the defense attaché at U.S. Embassy Moscow during a particularly eventful period in U.S.-Russian relations.

A distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, Lt. Gen. Klotz attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, where he earned an MPhil in international relations and a DPhil in politics. He is also a graduate of the National War College in Washington, DC. Most recently, Lt. Gen. Klotz was a senior fellow for strategic studies and arms control at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
ROBERT M. SCHER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES

BEFORE THE HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
SEPTEMBER 10, 2015

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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on missile defense and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. I am grateful for your consistent attention to and continuing support of the critical mission of defending our homeland, our partners and Allies, and deployed forces from a growing ballistic missile threat.

I would like to state upfront that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) places no limitations on the Department of Defense. For the Department, we do not see our activities in terms of deterrence or reassurance in the Middle East fundamentally changing, and this includes our enhanced missile defense plans. For decades, we have focused on and prioritized the totality of challenges that Iran poses to our interests in such a vital region. As my colleague Elissa Slotkin mentioned to you this morning, the Department has organized itself to deal with Iran through our preparations, partnerships, force posture, and plans. This is particularly true when it comes to our activities in the face of Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, the topic of my testimony today. I must say upfront that although I am happy to speak at length about our missile defense plans, non-proliferation programs and actions that restrict Iran's nuclear activities and ballistic missile development fall outside of my portfolio and I will have to defer those questions to the State Department.

As you have been briefed, the JCPOA is a nuclear deal, not a ballistic missile deal. Because Iran continues to develop and deploy a wide range of ballistic missiles, there is nothing in the deal that obviates the need for ballistic missile defenses (BMD) and we envision no changes to our missile defense posture or plans in the region or elsewhere as a result of the JCPOA. Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and today can strike targets throughout the region and into Eastern Europe. In addition to its growing missile inventories, Iran is seeking to enhance the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems. While Iran has not yet developed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), its progress on space launch vehicles, which utilize technologies applicable to ICBM-range missiles, provides Iran the means to develop longer range missiles. There is no doubt in my mind that Iran's ballistic missiles activities continue to pose a risk to the United States, and our partners and allies in Europe, Israel, and the Gulf. However, this is exactly why the United States has maintained a

robust BMD posture throughout the region and it has been a focus of cooperation with those same partners and allies.

Homeland Defense

As noted, Iran has not yet deployed ICBMs, but I want to reaffirm that the U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential limited ICBM attacks from Iran should they deploy such a capability in the future. We continue to strengthen our homeland defense posture and invest in technologies which better enable us to address emerging threats in the next decade. These improvements include continued improvement to the ground-based midcourse defense system (GMD). We remain on track to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska by the end of 2017. These interceptors, along with the 30 that are currently deployed, will provide protection against both North Korean and Iranian ICBM threats as they emerge and evolve.

The Department is committed to modernizing the GMD system to make it a more reliable and effective defense of the United States. The budget request we submitted in February includes funding for development of a new radar that, when deployed in Alaska, will provide persistent sensor coverage and improve discrimination capabilities against North Korea. It also continues funding for the redesign of the kill vehicle for the Ground-Based Interceptor. Although we have fixed the causes of past failures in the GBI related to the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, the redesigned kill vehicle will improve reliability and provide greater discrimination capability.

As directed by Congress, the Missile Defense Agency is also conducting environmental impact studies at four sites in the Continental United States (CONUS) that could host an additional GBI missile field. These studies will be completed in 2016. While a potential additional CONUS interceptor site would add some operational capability, it would come at a significant materiel development and service sustainment cost. We believe that currently the highest priorities for the protection of the homeland should be improving the reliability and effectiveness of the GBI and improving the GMD sensor architecture. The current GMD system provides coverage of the entire United States from North Korean and potential Iranian ICBMs. If an ICBM threat were to emerge in numbers that necessitated the deployment of additional interceptors, the steps being taken now, to include conducting an environmental impact

statement, will shorten the construction timelines associated with deployment of a new missile defense site.

Regional Missile Defense

The Administration continues to recognize the Iranian ballistic missile threat, remains committed to strengthening our regional missile defense capabilities, and will keep working with partners and allies to strengthen their capabilities and foster interoperability. As President Obama stated in Prague on April 5, 2009 “Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran’s neighbors and our allies. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven.” I would like to note that the President said nuclear AND ballistic missile activity.

In 2009 we pledged that the European Phased Adaptive Approach would have the ability to defend all NATO Europe from Iranian ballistic missiles and that pledge remains. EPAA Phases 1 and 2 are designed to address the SRBM and MRBM threat to Europe with existing and new BMD capabilities as they became available. The Aegis Ashore site in Romania (part of Phase 2) is nearing completion and will achieve technical capability declaration by the end of this year. The fourth BMD-capable U.S. Navy destroyer will arrive in Rota later this month. Because of the significant capability this weapon system will add to NATO BMD, we are working with Allies and the NATO staff to integrate it into NATO’s existing BMD system. Phase 3 is designed to expand existing defenses to address MRBMs and IRBMs over the next several years. We will break ground on the Aegis Ashore site in Poland during the spring of 2016. That site will become operational during the 2018 timeframe. A new interceptor, the SM-3 Block IIA, along with upgrades to our fielded weapon systems and command and control network will enable EPAA Phase 3 capabilities to extend coverage to all NATO allies and U.S. forces and bases in Europe.

In addition, European NATO member nations are investing in BMD systems to complement capabilities fielded under EPAA Phase 2 and 3. For example, the Netherlands and Denmark are investing in upgrades for their radars for their Air Defense Frigates. The first test of an improved radar on a Dutch Air Defense Command Frigate will be during a demonstration and test in October 2015. Additionally, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Greece have Patriot

systems, while France and Italy have other point defense systems. And all Allies contribute to NATO's common-funded command, control, and data integration systems.

Outside of NATO, our commitment to working with Israel to address the Iranian ballistic missile threat is iron clad. We are currently co-developing missile defense technology with Israel on David's Sling and the Arrow system. Since 2001, we have provided over three billion dollars for BMD to Israel, including funding for Iron Dome. We will continue to prioritize Israel missile defense efforts. More recently, the Secretary visited Israel in July and discussed this specific issue with both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Ya'alon. The Department continues to work closely with Israel on the threat posed by Iran's ballistic missile forces and these activities will continue. As the Secretary noted, we are full speed ahead on addressing these issues in collaboration with our Israeli counterparts.

The Department also continues to implement the deployment of missile defenses with a number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which are tailored to the security circumstances in the Middle East and that focus on security cooperation and building partner capacity. Our first goal is to support the purchase of missile defense systems through the foreign military sales (FMS) program. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is procuring the THAAD system, with the first delivery expected this year. This is in addition to the UAE's earlier purchase of Patriot systems, which have been delivered. Kuwait is purchasing Patriot PAC-3 batteries. Qatar recently signed a FMS case for Patriot batteries and has expressed interest in the future purchase of multiple THAAD batteries. Saudi Arabia is in the process of upgrading its existing Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the PAC-3 configuration and recently purchased PAC-3 interceptors. In addition, Saudi Arabia has signed a technical assistance case to develop a defense design supporting potential future purchase of multiple THAAD batteries.

When complemented by U.S. bilateral missile defense, these individual efforts are likely to make a significant contribution to BMD capabilities in the region. The nature of the threat also demands that we look at how missile defense strategies are coordinated GCC-wide. We cannot rely upon equipment alone, but must also ensure our GCC allies invest in training and interoperability to employ a truly effective BMD system against the Iranian threat. Again, during the Secretary's recent travel and in discussions with the Saudi Minister of Defense last Friday, we reiterated our commitment to working with Gulf countries on missile defense, specifically

emphasizing the importance of collective BMD among the GCC and the importance of interoperability and a common intelligence picture. GCC member states committed to develop a region-wide ballistic missile defense capability, including through the development of a ballistic missile early warning system. The United States will help conduct a study to refine the requirements and develop the architecture for the GCC-wide Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. All participants decided to undertake a senior leader tabletop exercise to examine improved regional ballistic missile defense cooperation.

Another promising example of possible future expanded BMD cooperation in the region is GCC participation in the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Given that one of the CAOC's missions is missile defense, including C2, the presence of the GCC partners in the CAOC presents an opportunity in the future for increased situational awareness of missile threats in the region as well as the potential for future BMD planning and operational cooperation.

I am firmly convinced that the JCPOA is the best means available to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons. This deal also allows us to maintain strong, multilateral restrictions on Iran's missile program. Under the deal, UN restrictions on ballistic missile-related transfers will remain in place for eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the IAEA reaches its Broader Conclusion, whichever is sooner. Even after that time, we will maintain the rest of the existing multilateral non-proliferation regime to prevent Iran from buying or selling ballistic missile technology. Although the ballistic missile threat from Iran remains, we will maintain a robust force posture in the region to deter against and respond to any potential Iranian aggression. We will continue to remain vigilant and hold Iran accountable against these remaining restrictions.

Robert M Scher
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT: Mr. Robert Scher was appointed as the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for the new Office of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in December 2014. Mr. Scher is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on: national security and defense strategy; the forces and contingency plans necessary to implement defense strategy; nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy; and security cooperation plans and policies.

PAST EXPERIENCE: Mr. Robert Scher previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces. In this role, he oversaw the development of guidance for military campaign and contingency plans, the processes for reviewing and assessing these plans, and the development and implementation of U.S. global defense posture. Prior to serving as DASD Plans, Mr. Scher was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Southeast Asia within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. In this capacity, Mr. Scher served as the principal advisor to senior leadership within the Department of Defense for all South and Southeast Asia policy matters pertaining to strategies and plans, including international strategy development, and implementation. He was responsible for managing the bilateral security relationships with the nations of this region and spearheaded DoD participation in regional multilateral fora.

Prior to his first appointment in 2009, Mr. Scher was an associate at the consulting firm of Booz Allen Hamilton where he led efforts to assist Asian nations in improving their defense and national security decision making processes. He also led analytical efforts supporting the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on strategy development and Asia-related issues. Earlier, Mr. Scher worked for 15 years in the Departments of Defense and State, and held numerous posts covering Asian security and defense policy issues. He served as Chief-of-Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, overseeing the operation of the OSD office responsible for bilateral and multilateral security relations in Asia. Additionally, Mr. Scher helped develop the strategic basis for U.S. defense strategy, participating in the oversight of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. He co-authored Presidential Decision Directive-56 on conducting complex contingency operations, and was involved in planning for U.S. support to operations ranging from Iraqi election support to deploying U.S. forces to East Timor and the southern Philippines. While at the Department of State, he served on the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff providing advice on Asia, counterterrorism and political military affairs. Mr. Scher entered government service through the Presidential Management Fellowship Program.

EDUCATION: Mr. Scher has a Bachelor of Arts from Swarthmore College, conferred with High Honors, and a Masters of International Affairs from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, where he was awarded a DuPont International Affairs Fellowship.

**Vice Admiral James D. Syring
Director, Missile Defense Agency**

Vice Admiral James Syring is from Muncie, Indiana. A 1985 graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree in Marine Engineering, he received his commission as an ensign. Subsequent to commissioning, he was designated an engineering duty officer. In 1992, Syring earned his Master of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the Naval Post Graduate School.

Ashore, Syring served in numerous engineering duty officer assignments including: ship superintendent for USS Port Royal (CG 73); Aegis test officer for new construction DDG 51 class ships; combat systems, test and trials officer in the DDG 51 Aegis Shipbuilding Program Office; Combat Systems Baseline manager in the Aegis Technical Division; director for Surface Combatants, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition). Syring served as the technical director for the U.S. Navy's DDG 1000 Shipbuilding Program and followed that tour as the DDG 1000 major program manager.

Upon selection to flag rank in 2010, Syring served as the program executive officer for Integrated Warfare Systems, responsible for acquiring, developing, delivering and sustaining integrated weapons systems for ships, submarines, carriers and aircraft within the Fleet and Joint Force.

In November 2012, Vice Admiral Syring became the 9th director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. In this capacity, he oversees the MDA's worldwide mission to develop a capability to defend deployed forces, the United States, allies, and friends against ballistic missile attacks.

Syring's personal awards include the Distinguished Service medal, Legion of Merit (2 awards), the Meritorious Service medal (4 awards), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation medal, and Navy and Marine Corps Achievement medal.

Updated: 20 November 2014

**Major General Steven M. Shepro
Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5**

Maj. Gen Steven M. Shepro is Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He provides strategic direction, policy guidance, and planning focus to develop and execute the National Military Strategy. Through the Director Strategic Plans and Policy, he enables the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.

General Shepro was commissioned in 1984 as a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and is an Olmsted Scholar fluent in six languages. He is a command pilot with more than 3,000 flying hours in fighters, helicopters, and tactical airlift with 600 combat hours in multiple operations. He has commanded at operational squadron, group and wing levels, has served on the Joint Staff, Air Staff, combatant command staff, coalition headquarters staff with Army ground units, and led frontline units of Battlefield Airmen in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was most recently the Director of Air Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force.

EDUCATION

1984 Distinguished graduate, Bachelor of Science degree, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
 1990 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
 1995 Master of Science degree, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Université de Strasbourg, France
 1996 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence
 1999 Escuela Superior de Guerra Aerea, Buenos Aires, Argentina
 2001 Air War College, by correspondence
 2005 Master's degree in national security, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 2005 Army Airborne School, Fort Benning, Ga.
 2011 Senior Executive National and International Security Program, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. August 1984-June 1985, Student, undergraduate pilot training (helicopter), Fort Rucker, Ala.
2. June 1985-March 1987, H-1 Pilot, 37th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Warren AFB, Wyo.
3. June 1987-June 1988, H-1N Weapons Officer and Instructor Pilot, 67th Special Operations Squadron, Zaragoza Air Base, Spain
4. June 1988-December 1988, Student, UPT (fixed wing conversion), Vance AFB, Okla.
5. December 1988- March 1989, Student, lead-in fighter training, Holloman AFB, N.M.
6. July 1989-July 1991, A-10 Flight Commander, 509th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Royal Air Force Alconbury, England
7. August 1991-October 1992, A-10 flight commander and instructor pilot, 78th and 510th Tactical Fighter Squadrons, RAF Bentwaters, England
8. October 1992-September 1995, Olmsted Scholar, Council of Europe and European Parliament Intern, Strasbourg, France
9. October 1995-September 1997, F-16 Chief, Weapons and Training Flight, 388th Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, Utah
10. December 1997-December 1998, Student, Escuela Superior de Guerra Aerea, Argentina
11. December 1998-December 2001, Chief, International Fighter Programs, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force (International Affairs), Washington, D.C.
12. April 2002-November 2002, Director of Operations, 52nd Operational Support Squadron, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany
13. November 2002-June 2004, Commander, 2nd Air Support Operations Squadron, Wurzburg, Germany
14. August 2004-June 2005, Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
15. July 2005-May 2007, Commander, 18th Air Support Operations Group, Pope AFB, N.C.
16. July 2007-July 2008, Vice Commander, 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, Balad Air Base, Iraq
17. August 2008-June 2010, Commander, 316th Wing, and Installation Commander, Joint Base Andrews, Md.
18. July 2010-July 2012, Director for Strategy, Policy and Plans (J5), Headquarters U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Fla.
19. August 2012-August 2013, Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command Afghanistan; and Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan

20. September 2013-June 2014, Director of Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
 21. June 2014- present, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. November 2002-June 2004, senior air liaison officer to 1st Infantry Division, Wurzburg, Germany (February 2003-April 2003, senior air liaison officer to V Corps Assault Command Post, Iraq; February 2004-April 2004, senior air liaison officer to Multi-National Division-North, Tikrit, Iraq), as a lieutenant colonel
2. July 2005-May 2007, senior jump air liaison officer to 18th Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, N.C. (August 2005-February 2006, senior air liaison officer to Multi-National Corps-Iraq), as a colonel
3. July 2010-July 2012, Director for Strategy, Policy and Plans (J5), Headquarters U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Fla., as a brigadier general
4. July 2012-August 2013, Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command Afghanistan; and Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan, as a brigadier general

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot
 Flight hours: More than 3,000, including 600 combat hours
 Aircraft flown: F-16, A-10, H-1, C-27

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
 Bronze Star Medal with four oak leaf clusters
 Air Medal with three oak leaf clusters
 Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Aerial Achievement Medal with two oak leaf clusters
 Air Force Combat Action Medal
 Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with "V" device
 Humanitarian Service Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 30, 1984
 First Lieutenant May 30, 1986
 Captain May 30, 1988
 Major Dec. 1, 1995
 Lieutenant Colonel April 1, 2000
 Colonel July 1, 2005
 Brigadier General Aug. 2, 2010
 Major General Dec. 3, 2013

(Current as of June 2014)

UNCLASSIFIED



JCPOA: Iran Missile Defense and Nonproliferation

Statement before the

U.S. House Committee on Armed Services

Sub-Committee on Strategic Forces

10 September 2015

Mr. Christopher J. Almont

Senior Defense Intelligence Expert

For Iran and the Arabian Peninsula

Defense Intelligence Agency

UNCLASSIFIED

Good Morning, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to offer testimony today regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and implications for Iran's missile defense and nonproliferation.

Iran continues to be a threat to regional stability as its regime's national interests often diverge with U.S. and our regional allies' security priorities in the dynamic and turbulent region. Understanding Tehran's support to terrorists and subnational armed groups as well as its military capabilities and regional ambitions are a priority for DIA's analysts and collectors. For years to come, we expect Iran to be a difficult target. Our challenge will be to decipher the progress the regime and security apparatus has accomplished during this period of unrest in the region. For Iran, its national security strategy remains to ensure the regime's survival, expand its regional influence, and enhance Tehran's military deterrence and superiority.

The JCPOA increases the international community's insight into Iran's nuclear capabilities and activities. It extends the time Iran would need to produce weapon grade uranium for a nuclear weapon from as little as 2-3 months to about one year. Further, the nuclear deal will freeze Iran's ability to produce and reprocess weapons-grade plutonium for at least 15 years. The JCPOA gives the IAEA some additional tools to investigate Iranian breaches of the prohibitions on weapons-grade enrichment and development of support technologies. Without a source of weapon grade uranium or plutonium, Iran cannot produce a nuclear weapon.

The international community also is positioned to detect changes to Iran's declared nuclear facilities that could enable Tehran to shorten the time needed to produce fissile material. IAEA monitoring of uranium mills and centrifuge production - as well as Iran's implementation of the Additional Protocol- also would make it harder for Iran to divert these materials to support a covert program without being detected. The JCPOA also prohibits specific R&D activities that would contribute to the development of a nuclear weapon and provides tools for the IAEA to investigate any possible breaches of these prohibitions.

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Iran's ballistic missile capability will continue to threaten U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Iran's overall defense strategy relies on a substantial inventory of theater ballistic missiles capable of striking targets throughout the region. Iran will continue to develop more sophisticated missiles and is improving the range and accuracy of its current missile systems irrespective of JCPOA implementation. Iran publicly stated that it intends to launch a space launch-vehicle as early as this year. This vehicle would be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges, if configured as an ICBM.

Post-JCPOA economic growth could provide Tehran more money for ballistic missile development, but engineering and infrastructure challenges will remain. U.N. restrictions on ballistic missile-related sales and purchases will remain in place for eight years following Adoption Day or until the IAEA reaches its Broader Conclusion, whichever is sooner. After UN restrictions end, international and domestic tools such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and U.S. export controls will still apply, and the U.S. will retain its ability to impose missile-related sanctions under non-nuclear sanctions authorities, including under Executive Orders 12938 and 13382. In addition, secondary sanctions will continue to attach to foreign financial institutions and other persons that engage in transactions with Iranian missile proliferators sanctioned by the Department of the Treasury.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to discuss these important topics. I look forward to the subcommittee's questions and a more detailed discussion in the closed session.

**Christopher J. Almont
Senior Defense Intelligence Expert
Iran and the Arabian Peninsula
Middle East/Africa Regional Center (MARC)**

Mr. Almont assumed his current position upon his appointment to DISL in January 2014. His responsibilities include guiding and directing analysis and collection for defense and security matters related to Iran and the Arabian Peninsula.

Born in Chester , Pennsylvania, Mr. Almont received his B.A. in International Studies from Virginia Tech in 1991, and his M.A. in History (European) from George Mason in 2000.

Mr. Almont received his commission in the United States Air Force in 1991 , serving until 1996 as an intelligence officer at US Central Command Air Forces and the 78th Fighter Squadron, both at Shaw AFB, S.C. During this time he deployed three times to southwest Asia in support of Operation Southern Watch and to Haiti in support of Operation Restore Democracy. He worked for Booz-Allen & Hamilton in Alexandria, Virginia in missile defense until joining DIA in 2001 as an Iran analyst. He has since been the Deputy Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues, and Senior Intelligence Officer for the Middle East-Africa Regional Center. In 2009 he deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Mr. Almont received the Defense Intelligence Agency Award for Excellence in 2008, the Defense Civilian Combat Support Medal in 2008, and two Deputy Director for National Intelligence Distinguished Analyst Awards.

Mr. Almont resides in Fairfax, Virginia, with his wife Darlene, and their two children.

March 2014

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

September 3, 2015

The Honorable Ernest Moniz
Secretary of Energy
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585

The Honorable John Kerry
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

The Honorable James Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511

Dear Secretary Moniz, Secretary Kerry, and Director Clapper:

As the Administration seeks to convince Congress to approve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran's nuclear program, statements by you and other senior Administration officials have indicated that the U.S. negotiators relied heavily on the expertise of the nation's national laboratories. In particular, laboratory experts conducted red teams and vulnerability assessments of various aspects of the deal to inform judgments on breakout timelines and monitoring protocols. As Secretary Moniz has said:

"The broad and deep expertise of the scientists and engineers at DOE's National Laboratories and nuclear security sites was brought to bear on the Iran negotiations from the start. Indeed, the decades of nuclear security experience and ingenuity of this dedicated workforce forms the foundation on which our confidence in the effectiveness of the agreement rests. Understanding and appreciating this dimension of the agreement should be a key consideration as Congress completes its evaluation process of the Iran deal."


To ensure Congress is equally informed by our nation's experts on these important matters as Secretary Moniz suggests, our committees require all documents, assessments, inputs, and recommendations (both those accepted and those rejected) provided by the national laboratories for these red teams and vulnerability assessments regarding the JCPOA and related side agreements regarding prior military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. The committees also require all documentation relaying questions and tasking to the laboratories.

Secretary Moniz, Secretary Kerry, and Director Clapper
September 3, 2015
Page 2

Finally, the committees require the Administration to provide details regarding whether any State party to a 123 Agreement with the United States has notified the Administration that it intends to renegotiate or otherwise alter its obligations under such an agreement due to the JCPOA. Similarly, the committees require the Administration to provide any other information it may have concerning the intentions of allies with respect to their civil nuclear capabilities.

To ensure this information informs congressional action on the JCPOA, submission of these documents and information is required by Tuesday, September 8. Thank you in advance for your prompt action. We agree with Secretary Moniz that consideration of the input of our national laboratory experts by both branches of government is important for understanding these highly technical matters.

Sincerely,




William M. "Mac" Thornberry
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services



Devin Nunes
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

WMT/DGN: dw

U.S. Funding to Israel for David's Sling




Note: Appropriated Amount is the top graph line; President's Budget Request is the bottom graph line.

Cumulative U.S. Missile Defense Funding to Israel

Congressional Funding = \$3.055 billion

Administration Requests = 1.693 Billion

Funding in Millions



Note: Appropriated Amount is the top graph line; President's Budget Request is the bottom graph line.

Note: PB Request figures include \$204m post-budget request funding in FY 2011, \$70m in reprogrammed FY 2012 funding, and \$225m in emergency funding for FY 2014.

Note: FY 16 appropriated amount is based on FY 16 HAC/SACD figures not yet signed into law.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Did you, or did any NNSA personnel, see a draft or the final version of the confidential agreement between the IAEA and Iran?

a. Did the national lab “red teams” see the confidential agreement between IAEA and Iran?

b. So, it was the case that the labs red teams relied on representations by the administration? Who? Which officials? General Klotz, were you one?

c. Was the red team tasked with assessing the integrity of the IAEA agreement with Iran or assessing whether this regime would in fact answer the question of what the Iranians have done at Parchin?

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain Annex 3 of the JCPOA, which spells out the kinds of civil nuclear cooperation Iran can expect to receive from the United States and other parties to the agreement.

a. Will Russia or China, or the IAEA for that matter, be able to provide any U.S. origin technology, know-how, or material to Iran?

b. Will we provide any technology, material or know-how to Iran to “harden” its nuclear capabilities from foreign cyber capability?

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Is there any legitimate reason for Iran to produce highly enriched uranium, which is to say, HEU enriched to above 4%?

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Can you tell us who first revealed Iran’s uranium enrichment capability in 2003? Was it the IAEA?

a. When did the U.S. first detect it?

b. Did we share that information with the IAEA?

c. What covert nuclear capability has even been detected by the IAEA?

d. Would you support sharing with the IAEA all of our capabilities to detect Iranian cheating with this agreement?

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, you were the Director for Nuclear Policy and Arms Control on the NSC from 2001 to 2003. Were you involved in the decision of the CIA to, in November 2002, provide Congress with an unclassified estimate on North Korea’s nuclear program that the United States had information since the early 1990s that North Korea had more than one nuclear weapon, notwithstanding its obligations under the Agreed Framework of 1994?

a. How should Congress ensure that no future administration is able to conceal evidence of cheating on these kinds of ad hoc arms control agreements?

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. As the senior DOD witness, are you able to pledge without hesitation that the administration will make no changes whatsoever in the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania and Poland as a consequence of the JCPOA? This should be a yes or no answer.

Secretary SCHER. Yes. There are no plans to change the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania and Poland as a consequence of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Mr. ROGERS. When the EPAA was announced, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review were announced, were they based on an assumption of free cooperation between Iran, Russia, China and North Korea on ballistic missile defense?

Is the administration updating its reviews of our ballistic missile posture to respond to the future Iranian ballistic missile program?

Secretary SCHER. The Administration considered many factors in formulating its national ballistic missile defense (BMD) policy in 2009, including our growing capabilities, Alliance relationships, affordability, and the current and projected threat.

The Department continuously evaluates its global missile defense posture and makes adjustments to account for the evolving threat, addition of new capabilities, and force sustainment and modernization requirements. If an Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile threat should emerge, our current deployment of Ground-Based Interceptors in the United States is postured to respond in the near term.

If the threat should grow, we have developed hedge measures to bolster our homeland defense system in the future.

Mr. ROGERS. Does DOD support the Israeli requests for U.S. support for coproduction of Arrow III and David's Sling? No funds were in the administration budget request for it and we've heard nothing official from the administration about the funds provided in the Strategic Forces Mark provided in the FY16 NDAA.

Secretary SCHER. The Department supports the current President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2016 (PB2016) for coproduction of the Arrow 3 interceptor or the David's Sling Weapon System (DSWS). The PB2016 for Israeli Programs was developed based on the U.S. assessment of the executable rate of progress for the Arrow 3 and the DSWS, and the U.S.-Israeli project agreements currently support the PB2016 submittal.

Regarding the DSWS, the additional \$150.0 million funding increase for co-production may be premature given the acquisition phase of the DSWS. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget request was developed as an integrated and balanced approach to meet the needs of the entire ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) budget profile. The Department officially responded to Congress in its July 31, 2015, Budgetary Appeal recommending that the \$150.0 million in the House and Senate bills be redirected from this congressional "add" to restore the reductions elsewhere to U.S. BMDS programs.

Concerning the Arrow-3, this co-development program is at an earlier stage of the development process, with additional knowledge points and technical milestones required prior to transitioning from development to production.

Mr. ROGERS. The President requested approximately \$155 million for Israeli Missile Defense in the FY16 budget request, but Israel's actual needs were approximately \$475.2 million. Secretary Kerry and the President like to tout the administration's support for Israeli Missile defense; how do you explain this underfunding then?

a. Likewise, in FY15, the administration requested \$176 million, but the actual requirement was \$351 million.

b. Or, David's Sling. The President requested \$46 million in FY11, \$41 million in FY12, \$38 million in FY13, \$32 million in FY14, \$31 million in FY15, and \$37 million in FY16, or approximately \$225 million. Over that same time, according to the government of Israel, with which this committee agreed, the actual requirement was \$770 million. The administration underfunded the requirement by one-third. Mr. Scher, can we expect this underfunding to continue under the JCPOA? Is this what the administration means by support to Israel?

Secretary SCHER. Our commitment to Israel is ironclad. We recognize that Israel faces very real missile threats from a number of actors in the region, and Israel's security remains a top priority. In addition to Foreign Military Financing assistance, the United States has provided more than \$3 billion in missile defense assistance to Israel since 2001. DOD has worked with Israel to develop, produce, and fund a multi-layered missile defense architecture that includes the Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow weapon systems. The President Budget request for Fiscal Year 2016 includes Israeli programs and was developed based on the U.S. assessment of an executable rate of progress with the U.S.-Israeli project agreements supporting the budget submittal. We will continue to ensure the most effective use and efficient investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars for the security of our strategic partner.

Mr. ROGERS. We've heard much from the administration about missile defense integration and interoperability as a solution to our own missile defense shortfalls. We've been told much of this will work through organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council. However, based on recent reporting, it appears that is not working as planned. In an article "Little Progress Made on Integrated GCC Missile Shield", we see that we haven't even been able to achieve agreement on the establishment of a command-and-control center, how it will be operated, or even shared training capabilities and foreign disclosure. What are the obstacles to getting this done?

Secretary SCHER. The United States continues to engage our Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners in pursuit of an interoperable missile defense architecture. At Camp David, the President pledged U.S. assistance to the GCC member States in their commitment "to develop a region-wide ballistic missile defense capability." This end state will require us to progress from bilateral missile defense cooperation between the U.S. and its GCC partners today to a more integrated multilateral approach in which the partners are sharing sensor data, developing joint missile defense operating concepts and training together. While reaching this end state will not occur overnight, we believe we are on the right path working with our GCC partners to facilitate the purchase of U.S. missile defense systems, engaging them in operational discussions through USCENTCOM and supporting analytic and re-

quirements assessments related to developing a ballistic missile defense architecture and a GCC-wide Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.

Mr. ROGERS. What is the likely impact on Iran's ballistic missile program of its ability to test freely its ballistic missile capability?

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain the role that foreign ballistic missile technology has been assessed to play in Iran's ICBM development? The JCPOA and resultant U.N. Security Council Resolution will phase out the limitations on such development, correct?

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Is there any legitimate reason for Iran to produce highly enriched uranium, which is to say, HEU enriched to above 4%?

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Can you tell us who first revealed Iran's uranium enrichment capability in 2003? Was it the IAEA?

a. When did the U.S. first detect it?

b. Did we share that information with the IAEA?

c. What covert nuclear capability has even been detected by the IAEA?

d. Would you support sharing with the IAEA all of our capabilities to detect Iranian cheating with this agreement?

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Why do you assess the Saudis are interested in purchase—in fact, becoming the first foreign buyer—of the Russian Iskander nuclear-capable ballistic missile?

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. What country provided Yemen's rebels with the ballistic missile they used to kill 45 UAE troops over the weekend?

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. What are Iran's biological and chemical weapons capabilities? Do you assess they have the capability to weaponize biological and chemical weapons? Is Iran behaving consistently with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention?

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. In a press report "Iran Already Sanitizing Nuclear Site, Intel Warns", dated August 5, it was reported that Iran began sanitizing the Parchin site shortly after the JCPOA was signed. Mr. Almont, what can you tell us about the activities Iran undertook to sanitize the Parchin site? Was this the first time Iran has undertaken to sanitize Parchin?

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Can you please describe the status of discussions with Israel concerning David's Sling development and potential coproduction?

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has not commenced formal negotiations with the Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) regarding a proposed David's Sling Weapon System (DSWS) Production Agreement. MDA initiated preliminary discussions of a technical nature and provided to IMDO what MDA views as the basic tenets of a possible DSWS production agreement. International agreements typically require 9–12 months to negotiate and conclude; however our experience has shown that complicated agreements sometimes lead to protracted negotiations that extend that timeline. For example, the Iron Dome Procurement Agreement took 17 months from the start of negotiations to conclusion.

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the impact to our BMD (other capabilities) if you are forced to operate under sequester level spending or a yearlong CR?

a. Can you articulate specific impacts to our counter-Iran posture in Europe and the Mideast?

b. Is it correct then that you approve a funding level consistent with what was requested by the President in his budget request, such as the FY16 NDAA or FY16 Defense Appropriations bill?

Admiral SYRING. If forced to operate under sequestration levels, I testified earlier this year that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) would likely scale back or eliminate work that we started last year on the redesigned kill vehicle and the long range discrimination radar. Without these improvements, the country would be in serious jeopardy as the system would be overmatched over time.

A. I do not envision a negative impact to our missile defense plans for Europe or the Middle East due to sequestration. We are committed to our North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allies and remain on track to field European Phased Adaptive Approach Phases II and III by 2015 and 2018, respectively. For the Middle East, specifically Israel, the only impact of sequestration or a yearlong CR is related to any procurement funding Congress may appropriate for David's Sling or Arrow 3 produc-

tion. These would be considered new starts and we would not be able to transfer funding to Israel even if the production agreement is negotiated and concluded.

B. Yes, I support the President's FY16 budget

Mr. ROGERS. What is the likely impact on Iran's ballistic missile program of its ability to test freely its ballistic missile capability?

Admiral SYRING. I defer any questions regarding Iranian ballistic missile development and testing to the intelligence community.

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain the role that foreign ballistic missile technology has been assessed to play in Iran's ICBM development? The JCPOA and resultant U.N. Security Council Resolution will phase out the limitations on such development, correct?

Admiral SYRING. I defer any questions related to the specific terms and conditions of the JCPOA to the U.S. Department of State and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and any questions regarding Iran's ballistic missile technology development to the intelligence community.

Mr. ROGERS. When the EPAA was announced, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review were announced, were they based on an assumption of free cooperation between Iran, Russia, China and North Korea on ballistic missile defense?

Is the administration updating its reviews of our ballistic missile posture to respond to the future Iranian ballistic missile program?

Admiral SYRING. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) was the primary DOD-organization responsible for drafting the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. I defer to USD-P regarding the assumptions in the document and planned future updates.

Mr. ROGERS. Have you been tasked to update your assessments of Iran's ballistic and cruise missile capability now that the ballistic missile embargo and ballistic missile test prohibition have been, or will be, phased out?

Admiral SYRING. No, the intelligence community is responsible for updating assessments on Iran's ballistic and cruise missile capability.

Mr. ROGERS. In May 2009, an unclassified intelligence report issued by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) stated, "with sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015." Then, the administration changed its plans for BMD deployment because it claimed there was new intelligence that showed the threat from short and medium range Iranian BMs was already here. What is your best military advice for how lifting the embargo will affect the need for missile defenses, and how will it impact the rate at which Iran can make progress on an ICBM?

Admiral SYRING. I am not in position to assess the impact of lifting the embargo. This is the responsibility of the intelligence community and I defer to them for any assessments on lifting the embargo.

Mr. ROGERS. We've heard much from the administration about missile defense integration and interoperability as a solution to our own missile defense shortfalls. We've been told much of this will work through organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council. However, based on recent reporting, it appears that is not working as planned. In an article "Little Progress Made on Integrated GCC Missile Shield", we see that we haven't even been able to achieve agreement on the establishment of a command-and-control center, how it will be operated, or even shared training capabilities and foreign disclosure. What are the obstacles to getting this done?

Admiral SYRING. We are working with our counterparts within the Department to address GCC ballistic missile early warning system requirements. To that end, we participated in an August 2015 meeting with the GCC to further define their requirements. We are using the information from this meeting to inform a top-level engineering analysis and expect to meet again with our GCC partners later this year to review the work. We also plan to issue a request for information to industry to enable future evaluation of sensor and command, control and communication solutions.

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the impact to our BMD (other capabilities) if you are forced to operate under sequester level spending or a yearlong CR?

a. Can you articulate specific impacts to our counter-Iran posture in Europe and the Mideast?

b. Is it correct then that you approve a funding level consistent with what was requested by the President in his budget request, such as the FY16 NDAA or FY16 Defense Appropriations bill?

General SHEPRO. Sequester-level spending will have minimal impact on the overall enhancement of regional missile defense. The FY16 budget request includes adequate funding, consistent with the President's request, to enhance our homeland missile defense system, increase our regional missile defense capabilities, and main-

tain the Presidential commitment to the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

Mr. ROGERS. Representing the Joint Staff, can you articulate why NORTHCOM continues to include in its Integrated Priority List the need for an additional interceptor site—a third site—in the United States for the defense of the homeland?

General SHEPRO. The purpose of an IPL is to identify potential priority capability gaps across all mission areas. An individual IPL item details a specific potential gap and further identifies a multitude of possible mitigation actions/solutions.

In this case, an East Coast Site is mentioned as a potential mitigation action/solution, which is consistent with Congressional direction. However, at this time, USNORTHCOM does not have a requirement for an additional GMD interceptor site, based upon the current threat, and as further stated in testimony by CDRUSNORTHCOM over the past several years.

Mr. ROGERS. Have you been tasked to update your assessments of Iran's ballistic and cruise missile capability now that the ballistic missile embargo and ballistic missile test prohibition have been, or will be, phased out?

General SHEPRO. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. In May 2009, an unclassified intelligence report issued by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) stated, "with sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015." Then, the administration changed its plans for BMD deployment because it claimed there was new intelligence that showed the threat from short and medium range Iranian BMs was already here. What is your best military advice for how lifting the embargo will affect the need for missile defenses, and how will it impact the rate at which Iran can make progress on an ICBM?

General SHEPRO. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. What can you tell us about the findings of the Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) Study III completed approximately 4 years ago concerning our ability to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile threat?

a. Are you familiar with the JCM IV update that's being conducted at present? It will look out as far as the 2020s and beyond, right? b. Will this update take into account the impact of the concessions made in the JCPOA concerning Iran's ballistic missile program?

General SHEPRO. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. In FY 09 the President's budget request for the Missile Defense Agency was at \$9.3 Billion and based on current trend lines it could go as low as \$7.3 Billion in FY 18. What is the impact of these diminishing funding levels to our ability to protect our nation and our allies if the government of Iran violates the terms of the nuclear deal?

Admiral SYRING. Our President's budget (PB) 2016 request is sufficient to keep us on track to meet our missile defense commitments. My biggest concern remains the potential impacts to the Ballistic Missile Defense System if sequestration remains in place. As previously discussed before this committee, we have ballistic missile defense capabilities deployed today that address the current North Korean and Iranian threat and our PB 2016 budget request puts us in position to defend against future Iranian ballistic missile threats including a potential intercontinental ballistic missile. If sequestration remains in place, the Department would likely need to delay our planned improvements with the re-designed kill vehicle and the Long Range Discrimination Radar.

Mr. FORBES. What is the likely impact on Iran's ballistic missile program of its ability to test freely its ballistic missile capability?

a. Please explain the role that foreign ballistic missile technology has been assessed to play in Iran's ICBM development? The JCPOA and resultant U.N. Security Council Resolution will phase out the limitations on such development, correct?

b. When the EPAA was announced, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review were announced, were they based on an assumption of free cooperation between Iran, Russia, China and North Korea on ballistic missile defense?

c. Is the administration updating its reviews of our ballistic missile posture to respond to the future Iranian ballistic missile program?

d. Have you been tasked to update your assessments of Iran's ballistic and cruise missile capability now that the ballistic missile embargo and ballistic missile test prohibition have been, or will be, phased out?

Admiral SYRING. I defer any questions regarding Iranian ballistic missile development and testing to the intelligence community. a. I defer any questions related to the specific terms and conditions of the JCPOA to the U.S. Department of State and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and any questions regarding Iran's ballistic missile technology development to the intelligence community. b. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) was the primary DOD-organization responsible for drafting the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. c. I defer to USD-P regarding the assumptions in the document and planned future updates. d. No, the intelligence community is responsible for updating assessments on Iran's ballistic and cruise missile capability.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. Is it correct that the so-called 123 agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates would prohibit the possession of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology by that country?

a. Is it correct that the United States has been seeking the agreement of Saudi Arabia for this same so-called "Gold Standard"?

b. Has either country discussed with the U.S. whether or not they too, post negotiation of the JCPOA, can seek enrichment? Does the administration have a position on whether or not either country, both U.S. allies in the region and enemies of Iran, should continue to be held to these same apparently anachronistic policies?

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TURNER. Do you receive a regular intelligence briefing on matters within your purview as Administrator, NNSA and Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security? How often? What IC agency or element performs those briefings?

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TURNER. I raised in closed session with you a matter based on sensitive intelligence reporting. Was that the first you learned of this matter? Had you not been briefed on it before, including during your regular intelligence briefings? Were you subsequently briefed on the matter I raised? If so, by whom and when?

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TURNER. Are you aware of whether any other U.S. official responsible for this subject matter was aware of the issued covered in that sensitive intelligence reporting? If so, who?

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TURNER. Are you aware of any information concerning intentions by the UAE or Saudi Arabia regarding their plans to develop uranium enrichment capability?

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.]

